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Abstract. During and after the sovereign debt crisis that hit most of the EU member states after
the Great Recession, the question of the effectiveness of fiscal policy vis-a`-vis ensuring sustainable
growth rates and changing the economic structure of member states was highly debated. Accordingly,
this paper investigates the effects of shocks in government purchases and net taxes on the export
competitiveness of the eleven new EU member states: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Croatia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia. The countries are treated as a
homogenous sample, but the empirical analysis extends beyond this. Namely, the paper examines two
subsamples based on the exchange rate regimes of the eleven new EU member states: the fixed vs the
flexible exchange rate regime. By applying the panel VAR analysis, over the 1999-2015 period, we have
reached the following conclusions. First, fiscal austerity influences the level of exports in our sample.
Second, the effects of shocks in fiscal policy on the level of exports are short-lived. Third, shocks in
government purchases are the most important determinant for all the new EU member states. And
fourth, shocks in net taxes influence the level of export only in the countries that have the flexible
exchange rate regimes. Our results contribute to the literature that examines the effects of fiscal policy
on the competitiveness of national economies by highlighting both the duration effect of fiscal policy
on the level of export and also by pointing to the optimal economic instrument used with respect to
the currency arrangement of the country.
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1. Introduction
The question of the economic policy is often reviewed. This is especially true during and after
the times of crisis such as the sovereign debt crisis that hit most of the EU member states after
the Great Recession. If the importance and advantages of the independent monetary policy,
[5, 16, 18], are taken into account as well, the focus of the discussion moves to the role of
the fiscal policy. If one adds to this the EU policy emphasis on the fiscal austerity, under the
prevailing influence of the German and the European Central Bank [34] the interest in Europe
is clear.
The issue of fiscal austerity positions itself as equally important for all the 28 EU mem-
ber states due to the centralized monetary policy, different exchange rate mechanisms and
ideological views on the role of the state (pro-Keynesian vs anti-Keynesian macroeconomic
management). For the small open economies, overall, and even more so for the new EU mem-
ber states, this leads academics, policymakers and the general public to the following question.
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Do internal and external balances move in the same direction? More directly, does reducing
budget deficit also reduce the current account deficit in the light of the twin deficits hypothesis?
Taking that into account, the main motivation of this paper stems from empirically incon-
clusive results of the research on the effects of fiscal austerity on the external balance and the
composition of GDP. There are still no clear answers to the question of the effectiveness of fiscal
policy vis-a`-vis ensuring sustainable growth rates and changing the economic structure of the
EU member states. Consequently, three research questions are set in the paper. First, does
fiscal austerity cause any movements vis-a`-vis the current account that can be classified as a
non-Keynesian adjustment or “expansionary fiscal consolidation? Second, are there differences
present with respect to the nature of fiscal austerity (expenditure-based vs tax-based)? Third,
are these effects economically significant? Accordingly, a research goal set in this paper is an
empirical evaluation of shocks in government purchases and net taxes on the export competi-
tiveness of the eleven new EU member states (Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia). In order to gain a clear
policy implication, the paper further divides the countries into subsamples based on their ex-
change rate regime (the flexible and the fixed exchange rate regime). The working hypothesis
of the paper states that fiscal consolidation improves the external competitiveness of national
economies, i.e. reducing government deficit results in increasing the level of exports due to
compositional shifts in the aggregate demand.
The conducted panel cointegration analysis enables a valid conclusion on the effects of shocks
in fiscal policy instruments using impulse response functions and the variance decompositions.
The paper adds to the existing literature in the following ways. It uses different measures
of fiscal policy as proxies for fiscal austerity (government purchases and net taxes instead of
commonly used cyclically adjusted primary balance) and it tests their impact on the level of
exports in the eleven new EU member states.
The paper is organized as follows. After the introduction, Section 2 gives a literature review
on the link between internal (budget) and external (current account) balance. Section 3 provides
an overview of the methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical results and discusses their
implications. Section 5 concludes.
2. The theoretical and empirical literature on the link between budget
balance and external competitiveness
The relationship between budget balance and external competitiveness is analysed from various
angles. Studies have included: (i) twin deficit vs twin divergence hypothesis, (ii) the role
of wealth, (iii) the role of risk premium and interest rates, (iv) the broader effect of fiscal
adjustment on output (non-Keynesian vs Keynesian effect) and (v) the narrow effect of fiscal
adjustment on external imbalances (competitiveness).
Ali Abbas et al. [2] present two major causal channels from fiscal policy to the current
account: (i) intratemporal trade and (ii) intertemporal responses. The first channel changes
the composition of aggregate demand through fiscal policy and the real exchange rate channel
thus influences the trade balance. The second channel emphasizes that economic agents are
rational and that the economy ends in a Ricardian outcome. An increase in budget deficit
induces rational agents to increase their labor supply and decrease their spending, which in the
end results in current account improvements.
Theoretical models imply that fiscal austerity should lead to improvements in the current
account balance through the exchange rate mechanism (e.g. the Mundell-Fleming model and
the open-economy general equilibrium model with overlapping generations, [24]). On the other
hand, empirical research suggests that large fiscal adjustments are needed in order to get eco-
nomically significant effects on the external competitiveness of national economies, i.e. the
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present effects are small and largely insignificant. Increasing them is politically risky and can
produce a significant amount of negative social externalities (e.g. the case of the Greek debt
crisis). This paper, as well as the existing empirical papers, ignores the political economy effects
of political cycles and other electoral and opportunistic determinants as in [1] and [34].
When it comes to empirical studies, confirmation of fiscal austerity, regardless of whether
it is expenditure or tax-based, was reported, although with rather small effects, by [2, 6, 7, 11,
12, 13, 14, 17] and [22].
3. Methodology
The relative importance of government purchases and net taxes for the export competitiveness
in selected Eurozone countries is analysed using a panel vector autoregression model (PVAR),
which takes the following reduced form:
Yit = Γ(L)Yit + ui + eit, i = 1, 2, ..., N t = 1, 2, ..., T, (1)
where Yit is a vector of endogenous stationary variables, referred to country i in time t, and
Γ(L) is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator, i.e. Γ(L) = Γ1L+ Γ2L
2 + Γ3L
3 + . . .+ ΓpL
p.
Individual heterogeneity of variables is captured by ui and eit is an idiosyncratic error. As
Yit is a vector of stationary variables, before estimating a PVAR model, we tested stationarity
of the variables employed in the analysis performing two panel unit root tests. Because there is
a possibility that the data may be cross-sectionally correlated, before testing for unit roots we
performed two cross-section dependence tests, i.e. the Breusch–Pagan test [9] and the Pesaran
test [28].The Pesaran cross-section dependence test has the best sample size properties when T
exceeds N , as is the case in our panel (see [15] for a survey).
If the hypothesis of cross-sectional independence is rejected, we cannot perform the standard
panel unit root tests, such as the IPS (Im–Pesaran–Shin [10]), the LLC (Levin–Lin–Chu, [19])
or the Maddala and Wu [20], which assume independence among cross sections (see for instance
[26] and [33]. Instead, the Bai and Ng PCe test [23] and the Pesaran Cross-Sectionally Aug-
mented IPS (CIPS) test [29] were applied. In the Bai and Ng PCe test the individual-common
decomposition is performed using one principal component instead of cross-section averages
CA as in CIPS [3]. Both tests allow for cross-sectional dependence with the basic assumption
that variables can be expressed as a sum of deterministic component and (unobserved) common
factors. Thus, in our analysis, we assume that the export or government purchase variables
could be desribed as:
xit = dit + γiFt + εit, i = 1, 2, ..., N t = 1, 2, ..., T, (2)
where dit is a deterministic component, Ft is a vector of unobserved common factors and εit
is an error term (idiosyncratic component).
The idea of the Pesaran CIPS test is to use the cross-section average x¯t of a variable xit as a
proxy for the common factor, which is then included in the model as an additional regressor. On
the other hand, in the Bai and Ng PCe test the individual-common decomposition is performed
using principal components instead of cross-section averages CA as in the CIPS [3]. The Bai
and Ng test separately applies unit root tests to the common factors as well as the idiosyncratic
component of the variable. If only one common factor is estimated (as in our case), an ADF test
is conducted. The null hypothesis of a unit root in the idiosyncratic components of all panels
is tested via the PMSB test statistics suggested by [4]. Monte Carlo experiments obtained by
Bain and Ng [4] point out that, in the case of a small N , PMSB test outperforms all other tests
regarding the size properties.
The existence of cointegration between variables was tested by the Pedroni [27] and the
Westerlund [33] cointegration tests. Both tests have a common null hypothesis of no cointegra-
tion. The alternative hypothesis of the Pedroni test is that the variables are cointegrated in all
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panels. On the other hand, the Westerlund test has two versions of the alternative hypothesis:
the variables are cointegrated in some of the panels and the variables are cointegrated in all the
panels.
Once the PVAR model has been estimated, the impulse response functions (IRFs) and the
variance decompositions (VDCs) were computed. Impulse response functions measure dynamic
responses of each variable to one standard deviation shock in other variables. On the other
hand, the variance decomposition measures the contribution of each shock to the forecast error
variation for all variables in the model. Both information is useful to estimate the impact of
shocks in the government purchase and net taxes on export. In calculating IRFs and VDCs,
variables have to follow the causal ordering. A variable that is higher in the ordering causes
contemporaneous changes in subsequent variables. Variables that are lower in the ordering
affect previous variables with a lag.
Since the economic theory or empirical studies do not provide an unambiguous ordering of
variables, in our study we selected the following ordering: export, government purchase and
net taxes. It seems reasonable to assume that net taxes are contemporaneously affected by the
shocks from export and government purchase since the government budget first sets the level
of expenditures and only then turns to the revenue side of the budget.
4. Empirical results
The effects of shocks in government purchases and net taxes on export competitiveness are
analysed for a cross-section of the eleven new EU member states: Bulgaria, the Czech Repub-
lic, Estonia, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia for
the period from 1999 to 2015. Data are provided from the Eurostat base. The results are then
compared to the results obtained by splitting the whole sample into two subsamples: coun-
tries with the flexible exchange rate regime (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania,
Slovenia and Slovakia) and countries with the fixed exchange rate regime (Bulgaria, Estonia,
Croatia, Latvia and Lithuania). Slovenia and Slovakia are included in the group of countries
with the flexible exchange rate regime due to the fact that Slovenia up to 2007 and Slovakia
up to 2009 had been outside the Eurozone and during that time period they had had flexible
exchange rate regimes.
We have decided to split the sample since the impact of the exchange rate regime on external
competitiveness is unclear. Ali Abbas et al. [2] state that the impact depends on whether the
import elasticity of output is higher or lower than the net export elasticity of the exchange rate.
Data for exports (volume of exports measured as a percentage of GDP; the variable EXPORT),
government purchases (in mil EUR, the variable GP) and net taxes (in mil EUR, the variable
NT) are obtained from Eurostat. Taking into consideration the study on Greece conducted by
[30], our main interest also focuses on two variables under the influence of fiscal policy.
Government purchases are calculated at the level of general government as a sum of gross
fixed capital formation and final consumption expenditure. Net taxes are also calculated at
the level of general government as a sum of taxes on production and imports, current taxes on
income and wealth, net social contributions and other current transfers (all receivables).
All variables are transformed to natural logarithms (labelled LEXP, LGP and LNT). The
results of cross-section dependence tests: the Breusch–Pagan (LM=228.562, p-value<0.001)
and the Pesaran (CD=9.01, p-value<0.001) indicate that the null hypothesis of cross-sectional
independence is strongly rejected, i.e. that export, government purchases and net taxes ex-
hibit some dynamics common to the countries. Based on the additional analysis, it is assumed
that all variables are driven by idiosyncratic elements and a single unobserved common fac-
tor. Therefore, unit root testing was performed on the basis of the usual t-statistics of ADF
regressions in the common factor and idiosyncratic components, proposed by [3], as well as the
pooled PMSB test, proposed by [5].
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Results of the Pesaran CIPS and the Bai and Ng (Common Factor ADF and PMSB) panel
unit root tests, presented in Tables 1 and 2, show that the variable export and the variable
net taxes are clearly nonstationary. Based on the additional analysis, it is assumed that all
variables are driven by idiosyncratic elements and a single unobserved common factor. There-
fore, unit root testing was performed on the basis of the usual t-statistics of ADF regressions
in the common factor and idiosyncratic components, respectively. Nevertheless, the results for
government purchase variable are not so straight. Namely, based on the results of the Pesaran
CIPS test it seems that for some countries the variable is stationary.
Level First difference
variable constant constant and trend constant constant and trend
LEXP −1.604 −1.291 −2.206∗∗ −2.261∗∗∗
LGP −2.358∗ −3.112∗∗ −3.762∗∗∗ −3.641∗∗∗
LNT −2.088 −2.993∗ −3.299∗∗∗ −3.217∗∗∗
Table 1: Pesaran CIPS panel unit root tests; sample period 1999-2015 (statistical significance
at 10%, 5% and 1% are denoted by ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗)
ADF Level First difference
variable constant constant and trend constant constant and trend
LEXP −0.938 −3.002∗∗∗ −3.855∗∗∗ −3.855∗∗∗
LGP −3.873∗∗∗ −3.873 −3.603∗∗∗ −3.591∗∗∗
LNT −1.724∗ −1.373 −3.191∗∗∗ −3.184∗∗∗
PMSB Level First difference
variable constant constant and trend constant constant and trend
LEXP −0.606 −0.157 −1.920∗∗ −1.829∗∗∗
LGP −0.381 0.220 −1.301∗ −0.938
LNT 0.520 0.810 −1.534∗ −1.325∗
Table 2: Bai and Ng panel unit root tests; sample period 1999-2015 (statistical significance at
10%, 5% and 1% are denoted by ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗)
Nevertheles, we assume that all variables are integrated of order one. As a result, we have
to test whether variables are cointegrated. To test whether the potential long-term relationship
between variables exists, we perform the Pedroni [27] and the Westerlund tests [33]. The
Pedroni test in an alternative hypothesis allows for heterogeneity, i.e. that cointegration for
each country exists, but the cointegration relationships differ across countries.
H0 : no cointegration H1 : variables are cointegrated in all panels
Test Pedroni Westerlund
Statistic constant constant and trend constant constant and trend
Modified Phillips-Perron 2.154∗∗ 2.236∗
Phillips-Perron 0.198 −2.762∗∗
Augmentd Dickey-Fuller 1.826∗∗ −0.801
Variance ratio −0.310 −1.184
Variance ratioa 0.676 −0.496
Table 3: Panel cointegration tests; sample period 1999-2015 (statistical significance at 10%, 5%
and 1% are denoted by ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗ and a for H1 : variables are cointegrated in some of the panels)
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The results of Pedroni’s tests (Table 3) are not unique. On the other hand, both Westerlund’s
tests, calculated with the Newey and West variance estimator, do not reject the null hypothesis
of no cointegration. Thus, an overall conclusion is that the variables in this study are not
cointegrated.
The impulse response functions IRF on the Figure 1, show that at the level of the total
sample fiscal consolidation affects the level of exports. However, the effect is short-lived (4
years) regardless of the budget side it is carried out at (government purchases or net taxes).
The change in government purchases affects exports more (the effect is stronger, approximately
three times in the first year) and it soon averages around zero. Results from the variance
decompositions (Table 4) confirm this conclusion with shocks in government purchases having
the bigger impact than the shocks in net taxes.
These results are in line with Marato and Mulas Granados [21] who emphasize the expen-
diture based fiscal austerity approach and also with Ali Abbas et al. [2] who find a stronger
current account response to fiscal policy changes in the emerging countries. The same effects
for increases in government spending are reported in [7, 8, 14], while Beetsma et al. [6] and
Tagkalakis [30] find the same effects for government purchases in the case of the ten EU countries
and Greece.
Figure 1: Impulse responses of DLEXP with 95% confidence intervals, to one standard
deviation shock in DLGP (left), DLNT (middle) and DLEXP (right)
The same analysis was then performed on two subsamples: a group of countries with the
flexible exchange rate and for the countries with the fixed exchange rate regime. The impulse
response functions are presented on the Figures: 2-3 and the variance decompositions for each
group are given in Table 4.
All sample countries FLEX exchange rate regime FIX exchange rate regime
step DLEXP DLGP DLNT DLEXP DLGP DLNT DLEXP DLGP DLNT
1 100.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00
2 80.30 16.84 2.86 82.59 9.74 7.67 76.86 22.98 0.16
3 78.21 18.10 3.69 80.28 12.18 7.53 72.76 23.49 3.75
4 78.14 18.14 3.72 80.27 12.20 7.53 72.44 23.59 3.96
5 78.14 18.14 3.72 80.27 12.20 7.53 72.42 23.59 3.99
6 78.14 18.14 3.72 80.26 12.20 7.53 72.42 23.59 3.99
Table 4: Variance decomposition (ordering: DLEXP, DLGP, DLNT)
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Figure 2: Impulse responses of DLEXPORT with 95% confidence intervals, to one standard
deviation shock in DLGP (left), DLNT (middle) and DLEXPORT (right) for countries with
flexible exchange rate regime
At the subsample level of six countries with a flexible exchange rate mechanism, we have
proved that fiscal consolidation affects the level of export. We have also confirmed that the
duration effect found in the total sample does not change once we focus on these six countries.
Namely, the effect vanished after 3-4 years. The IRF (Figure 2) shows that the change in net
taxes is the only important instrument of fiscal policy when it comes to exports, although
shorter (it vanishes after 3 years). And finally, the effect of net taxes is stronger than the one
obtained at the total sample level. Results from the variance decompositions (Table 4) confirm
this conclusion. These results are channelled through the nominal exchange rate depreciation
that took place in Hungary, Romania and Slovenia during the observed time period. Tsibouris
et al. [31] based their conclusion that the tax-based fiscal consolidation works only at the
initially low level of tax revenues in GDP, but we claim that it is the exchange rate mechanisms
that is important.
Figure 3: Impulse responses of DLEXPORT with 95% confidence intervals, to one standard
deviation shock in DLGP (left), DLNT (middle) and DLEXPORT (right) for countries with
fixed exchange rate regime
Our last estimation concerns the subsample of five countries that have a fixed exchange rate
mechanism. The results are in line with the ones obtained at the total sample level. Namely,
our working hypothesis that the fiscal consolidation affects the level of exports is validated also
at this subsample. The duration effect is the same (4 years), but it is stronger in the case of
government purchases, the change of which is the only important instrument of fiscal policy
when it comes to exports. Again, the results confirm the conclusion by [6, 8, 21, 30].
With respect to the theory, we can conclude that the results are in opposition to the Mundell-
Fleming model since we verify that under a fixed exchange rate regime an expansionary fiscal
shock crowds out exports.
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5. Conclusion
This paper has analysed the link between fiscal policy (shocks in government purchases and
net taxes) and the external competitiveness. The working hypothesis has been confirmed.
In the sample of the eleven new EU member states in the time period 1999-2015, the fiscal
consolidation actually improves external competitiveness by increasing the level of exports of
the national economies. The dominant channel is expenditure-based. With respect to the
research questions, we can conclude that the paper has answered all of them.
The paper’s contribution to the existing literature is fourfold. First, it has empirically
confirmed that the effects of the fiscal austerity on the external competitiveness are rather
short-lived (approximately 4 years). Second, the results point to a clear policy implication vis-
a`-vis different exchange rate regimes (expenditure-based fiscal austerity is preferred in the total
sample and in the subsample of countries that have the fixed exchange rate regime). Shocks
in net taxes influence the level of export only in the countries that have flexible exchange rate
regimes, but the predominant effects are still tied to the shocks in government purchases even in
this subsample. Third, it uses shocks in government purchases and net taxes instead of cyclically
adjusted primary balance as a proxy for fiscal policy, which yielded inconclusive results in the
existing empirical literature. Fourth, it empirically tested the relationship between shocks in
government purchases and net taxes on one side and the external competitiveness on a panel
of the eleven new EU member states.
One question does remain with respect to both duration and the size of the estimated
effects: Does statistical significance imply economic importance? The results are statistically
valid, but small effects that vanish after 4 years are not to be neglected. They point to a short
time span which is clearly the main limitation of the study since it influenced the econometric
model itself. Thus, future research should put special focus on the recession period and take
into consideration zero lower bound periods and ECB unorthodox policy measures. A further
division between recessions and expansions is preferred with respect to the policy implications
of the obtained results. Alternative methodologies should also be taken into consideration and
preferably data on quarterly and monthly intervals should be used.
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